



The purpose of this article is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for monetary 
policy. Inter alia, the changes include that the institu-
tional set-up will be subtly changed and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the fi rst part of 
the Treaty as one of the “other institutions and adviso-
ry bodies”. Possibly more importantly, the euro area as 
such will be in the position to act legally as itself within 
the European Union (EU) legal structures. The Euro-
group also will be offi cially recognised (“Euro-Ecofi n-
Council”). The rules for enhanced cooperation have 
also been further relaxed from the Treaty of Nice, also 
applying to the area of economic governance (e.g. eu-
ro area coordination, tax policy, exchange rates). What 
should we think of these reforms? Will they make euro 
area governance more effi cient and/or could they po-
tentially jeopardise the ECB’s independence and Euro-
pean  monetary policy?
The Reform of the Treaty
In essence, the content of the new proposed reform 
treaty is very similar to that of the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe.1 It has just been modifi ed 
and rephrased, as many heads of the different EU 
governments have already confi rmed. In July 2007, an 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has been held to 
discuss the “new” Treaty and to seek political support 
for all the amendments to the original treaties. The ma-
jor changes proposed include the removal of the three-
pillar structure of the EU, more democracy, changes 
to the institutional setup of the Union, improvement 
of the solidarity and security within the Union and 
enhancement of the position of the EU on the global 
stage.2 The three-pillar structure3 will be abolished to 
simplify the structure of the EU. The structure will be 
reorganised, with more emphasis on foreign and se-
curity policy and justice and home affairs. More de-
mocracy will be realised by giving national parliaments 
and the European Parliament (EP) a bigger say, while 
the power of the European Commission will decrease. 
The EP will be on an equal footing with the Council of 
Ministers in many areas in terms of decision-making. 
A withdrawal option will be included, in order to state 
that member states are part of the EU by their own 
choosing. Moreover, there will be some opt-out op-
tions in the area of police and criminal law, as urged 
by the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The 
change in the institutional set-up of the ECB will be 
most important for the working of monetary policy and 
the status of the ECB. The latter effects will be singled 
out later in the text and treated in more detail. Further-
more, decision-making will take place more swiftly and 
more commonly be supported by the system of quali-
fi ed majority voting, which will be introduced in more 
1 OpenEurope.org.uk/research/guide.pdf.
2 European Commission: Reforming Europe for the 21st Century, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM (2007) 412 
fi nal, Brussels, 10 July 2007.
3 The European Communities pillar, the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy pillar and the Police and Judical Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters pillar.
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Treaty Reform: Consequences for 
Monetary Policy
The proposed reform treaty, aimed at enhancing the effi ciency and democratic legitimacy 
of the enlarged Union as well as its position on the global stage, has a number of 
important implications for monetary policy and the status of the European Central Bank. 
Can the reforms be expected to make euro area governance more effi cient? Could they 




than forty new areas. This is also going to apply to 
economic governance. These measures include the 
relinquishing of veto power in many areas (including 
the ECB’s powers over fi nancial regulation), the ap-
pointment of a permanent President of the European 
Council, and a reinforcement of the Commission’s au-
thority. Also, it is easier to amend the treaty in the new 
form, by means of co-decision and qualifi ed majority 
voting, so that a new IGC will not be necessary. This 
also includes amending the articles concerning the 
ECB and its independence, as we shall see below. 
Consequences for European Monetary Policy and 
the ECB4
Article 107 (formerly III-187 of the Constitution) 
states that a number of Articles in the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks can, for the fi rst 
time, be amended by qualifi ed majority voting, on a 
proposal from the Commission: “Articles 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 
17, 18, 19.1, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32.2, 32.3, 32.4, 32.6, 
33.1(a) and 36 of the Statute of the ESCB may be 
amended by the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure.”
These articles include signifi cant ECB powers such 
as: the power to set minimum reserve requirements 
for banks and the power to fi ne fi nancial institutions; 
the power to conduct foreign exchange operations 
and make international agreements for currency co-
ordination; the power to set up and regulate clearing 
systems; and arrangements for sharing the profi ts of 
the ECB. The ultimate consequence of these chang-
es may imply that the ECB’s interest-rate policy could 
be neutralised by other EU institutions, like the EP 
and the Ecofi n council. The Ecofi n council could e.g. 
push the ECB to use (sterilised) exchange rate inter-
ventions, thus infl uencing more frequently the ECB’s 
monetary policy.
This would give the EP and the Ecofi n council more 
power and could affect the ECB’s independence and 
monetary policy. It has to be noted that these amend-
ments have to take place by co-decision and quali-
fi ed majority voting. Qualifi ed majority voting implies 
that not all countries have to be on board and that the 
larger countries have a relatively stronger voting posi-
tion. The possible collusion between the larger coun-
tries (compare the collusion of France, Germany and 
Italy regarding the non-enforcement of the Stability 
4 The following section draws on the research of Open Europe pub-
lished at www.OpenEurope.org.uk/research/guide.pdf.
and Growth Pact in recent years) may undermine the 
supranational character of policy decision-making 
and increase the tensions within the eurozone be-
tween the larger and smaller countries.
Article 114 of the new Treaty (which was Article 
III-194 of the original Constitution) will make the Eu-
rogroup – the informal meetings of fi nance ministers 
from eurozone countries – into a formal body with its 
own President, elected for two and a half years. This 
President may represent the eurozone in international 
fi nancial organisations like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The Eurogroup also gains the right to 
send recommendations to eurozone countries that 
are in breach of EU rules, and the power to decide 
(by majority voting) whether a non-eurozone country 
is ready to enter the euro area. 
Representation in International Financial 
Institutions
Article 115a (ex-111(4)) (137)(III-196)
In order to secure the euro‘s place in the inter-1. 
national monetary system, the Council, on a pro-
posal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision 
establishing common positions on matters of par-
ticular interest for economic and monetary union 
within the competent international fi nancial institu-
tions and conferences. The Council shall act after 
consulting the European Central Bank. 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 2. 
may adopt appropriate measures to ensure unifi ed 
representation within the international fi nancial in-
stitutions and conferences. The Council shall act 
after consulting the European Central Bank. 
For the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3. 
2, only members of the Council representing Mem-
ber States whose currency is the euro shall take 
part in the vote. 
These powers were already defi ned in the old Trea-
ty, although this new article is wider in scope. The 
actions following from this article are subject to the 
new qualifi ed majority voting procedure described in 
Article 205 (3)(a). It should be emphasised that this 
article, certainly the fi rst part, is so vague (“of particu-
lar interest for economic and monetary union”) that 
it may be easily misinterpreted and misused by the 
Council and other EU institutions. I would strongly 





Article 117 (ex-121(1), 122(2) and 123(5)) (139)
(…) “The Council shall act having received a rec-
ommendation of a qualifi ed majority of those among 
its members representing Member States whose cur-
rency is the euro. These members shall act within six 
months of the Council receiving the Commission‘s pro-
posal.” The only substantive change here is the power 
of the eurozone countries to give a recommendation, 
separately from the rest of the Council, on whether a 
candidate for the eurozone is qualifi ed to join it.
The Independence of the European Central Bank
Although Article 108 of the Treaty still states that 
“neither the European Central Bank, nor a national 
central bank, nor any member of their decision-mak-
ing bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union 
institutions or bodies, from any government of a Mem-
ber State or from any other body”, the fact that the 
European Central Bank will be grouped with institu-
tions such as the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Parliament affects its special status. This may 
have consequences for the functioning of the ECB in 
conducting effective monetary policy. The grouping of 
the ECB with other EU institutions will affect its inde-
pendence; this must be considered an extremely dan-
gerous development. President Jean-Claude Trichet5 
emphasised rightfully that only the ECB’s independ-
ence makes its monetary and exchange-rate policies 
credible and effective. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Execu-
tive Board Member of the ECB, mentioned the impor-
tance of central bank independence for credible and 
effective monetary policy.6 French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy7 seems to want to downgrade the independ-
ence of the ECB, so as to give the Council of Minis-
ters (and therefore the Ecofi n council) more power 
over monetary policy within the eurozone. In Table 1 
an overview of opinions by central bankers, politicians 
and other opinion leaders is presented.
Trade-off between Central Bank Independence 
and Conservativeness
The Maastricht Treaty has made the ECB very in-
dependent. Nowadays it is widely believed that a high 
level of central bank independence and an explicit 
mandate for the bank to restrain infl ation are impor-
tant institutional devices to assure price stability. It is 
5 Agence France Presse, 13 August 2007.
6 Lorenzo B i n i  S m a g i : The Future of the Treaty: implications for 
economic governance in Europe, speech, Frankfurt am Main, 5 July 
2007.
7 The Daily Telegraph, 11 August 2007.
thought that an independent central bank can give 
full priority to low levels of infl ation. In countries with 
a more dependent central bank other considerations 
(notably, the re-election perspectives of politicians and 
a low level of unemployment) may interfere with the 
objective of price stability. In that context the German 
central bank is often mentioned as an example. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank was relatively autonomous; 
at the same time, Germany had one of the best post-
Second World War infl ation records among the OECD 
countries. Indeed, the statutes of the ECB are largely 
modelled on the law governing the Bundesbank. 
Why would central bank independence, ceteris 
paribus, yield lower rates of infl ation? The theoretical 
reasoning in this fi eld stresses the “time inconsistency 
problem”.8 The basic idea behind the time-inconsist-
ency problem can be explained as follows. Suppose 
the policymaker announces a certain infl ation rate that 
(s)he considers optimal. If private sector agents take 
this announced infl ation rate into account in their be-
haviour, it becomes at that time optimal for the govern-
ment to renege and to create a higher than announced 
infl ation rate. The reason for this is that a burst of un-
expected infl ation yields certain benefi ts. For instance, 
unexpected infl ation reduces real wages, thereby in-
creasing employment.
Of course, this is only part of the story. The next step 
is to add rational expectations. Under rational expec-
tations economic agents know government’s incentive 
to create unexpected infl ation and take this into ac-
count in forming their expectations. Government has 
no other choice than to vindicate these. It is clear that 
the infl ation rate will be higher than under the situa-
tion in which the government stuck to its promise. No 
matter which factors exactly cause the dynamic in-
consistency problem, in all cases the resulting rate of 
infl ation is sub-optimal. Therefore in the literature de-
vices have been suggested to reduce this “infl ation-
ary bias”. Rogoff9 has proposed delegating monetary 
policy to an independent and “conservative” central 
banker. “Conservative” means that the central banker 
is more averse to infl ation than the government, in the 
sense that (s)he places a greater weight on price sta-
bility than the government does. 
8 F. W. K y d l a n d , E. C. P re s c o t t : Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of the Optimal Plans, in: Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 85, 1977, pp. 473-491; R. J. B a r ro , D. G o rd o n : Rules, Discre-
tion, and Reputation in a Positive Model of Monetary Policy, in: Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, 1983, pp. 101-121.
9 K. R o g o f f : The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate 




Treaty Reform with Respect to the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup
French President Nicholas Sarkozy
He seeks to increase the Council’s power over monetary 
policy, and mainly the French government’s power. This is 
made easier by the new draft Treaty.
(The Daily Telegraph, 17 August 2007)
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet 
He is concerned about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and is 
afraid that by including the bank in a list of EU institutions there is a risk that 
EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, an 
ECB spokesman explained.
UK Labour Government
Criticises the new Treaty for allowing the Eurogroup more 
power, while it does want the Council (and thus the UK) to 
have more power over euro area matters. This will of course 
jeopardise the position of the UK vis-à-vis eurozone countries.
(Open Europe Guide to the Treaty, 16 August 2007)
Open Europe Vice-Chairman Derek Scott
“France has always sought political control of the ECB: the new Treaty 
entrenches it.” 
(Open Europe Press Release, 16 August 2007)
Joaquin Almunia, EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner
“A central bank with an independent statute which feels under pressure 
would be liable to show that it is independent.” (Agence France Presse, 4 
September 2007)
Pietro De Matteis, Founder “United For Europe”
Lowering ECB independence may lead to less credible monetary policy, 
and even to political pressure making the monetary policy only fi t the poli-
cies of the big EU countries, leading to asymmetries. (TheNewFederalist.eu, 
15 August 2007)
Competition versus Protectionism
French President Nicholas Sarkozy
He managed to remove the reference to “free and undistorted 
competition” from the draft Treaty, as he does not see this as 
a target.
(EurActiv.com, 2 July 2007)
Open Europe Vice-Chairman Derek Scott
He opposed the change of the phrase “free and undistorted competi-
tion” and criticised Gordon Brown for being outmanoeuvred by Sarkozy in 
negotiations.
(The Daily Telegraph, 11 August 2007)
German Chancellor Angela Merkel
“It has been restructured, it hasn’t been devalued,” Merkel 
said, “since the free market is mentioned and the internal 
market is mentioned throughout this mandate.”
(EurActiv.com, 2 July 2007)
Daniel Gros, Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
“(…) important is that, in the eurozone, competition is increasing, reaching 
markets that were previously protected, in large countries such as France, 
and this is what is upsetting a number of politicians.” 
(EurActiv.com, 2 July 2007)
Table 1
An Overview of Opinions by Central Bankers, Politicians and Other Opinion Leaders
The Independence of the European Central Bank 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy
He has publicly criticised the position of independence of the 
ECB and tried to give the Council of Ministers more control 
over monetary policy. Sarkozy wants to see the policies of the 
bank oriented towards promoting growth and jobs in the euro-
zone, rather than simply being focused on controlling infl ation. 
(The Daily Telegraph, 17 August 2007)
“Mr Sarkozy’s criticism: politicians, not central bankers, 
should be in charge of exchange rate policy, as is the case in 
the US and most other countries, including Germany before 
1999, and the euro’s exchange rate should be actively man-
aged to be competitive.” (Wolfgang Münchau, Financial Times 
website, 1 July 2007)
German Chancellor Angela Merkel
She has supported the independence of the ECB after Sarkozy attacked it.
“Of course one can talk, but ECB decisions are a matter for the bank’s 
governing body alone,” (Agence France Presse, 19 July 2007)
Wolfgang Münchau, The Financial Times
“Sarkozy jeopardises the future of the euro area.” Mr. Münchau criticises 
Sarkozy for wanting to reduce the independence of the central bank in 
conducting monetary policy, for wanting to control the exchange rate of the 
euro and for increasing the French government defi cit instead of decreasing 
it. (Financial Times website, 1 July 2007)
Joaquin Almunia, EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner
“Everyone has a right to his opinion on monetary policy and on interest 
rates but nobody should put pressure on the (central) bank,” (Agence 
France Presse, 4 September 2007)
Several EU Ministers of Finance
They support the ECB’s independence and have clearly expressed their 
concerns about Sarkozy’s statements (Europa NU, 9 May 2007).
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, ECB Executive Board Member
His critique is that in negotiating the new treaty there are still governments 




Why would a central banker be more infl ation averse 
than the government? Two main differences have been 
pointed out in the literature between the preferences of 
the government and those of the central bank.10 One 
relates to possible differences in the time preference 
of political authorities and that of central banks. For 
various reasons, central banks tend to take a longer 
view of the policy process than do politicians. The 
other difference concerns the subjective weights in 
the objective function of the central bank and that of 
government offi cials. It is often assumed that central 
bankers are relatively more concerned about infl ation 
than about other policy goals such as achieving high 
employment levels and adequate government rev-
enues. If monetary policy is set at the discretion of a 
“conservative” and independent central banker, a low-
er average time-consistent infl ation rate will result. 
The central insights of this literature can be ex-
plained as follows. It is assumed that policy-makers 
seek to minimise the following loss function (L), which 
represents the preferences of the society:   
 
(1) = 1 π2 + χLG t  (yt – yt*)22 2
where yt is output, y* denotes desired output and χ is 
the government’s weight on output stabilisation (χ > 0). 
Output is driven by a simplifi ed Lucas supply function:
(2) = + utyt (πt – πte )
where π is actual infl ation, π e is expected infl ation, and 
ut is a random shock. Policymakers minimise (1) on 
a period by period basis, taking the infl ation expec-
tations as given. With rational expectations, infl ation 
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The fi rst term on the right hand side of equation (3) is 
the infl ationary bias. A country with a high infl ationary 
bias has a credibility problem, as economic subjects 
are aware of the government’s incentives for surprise 
infl ation. The second term in equation (3) refl ects the 
degree to which the stabilisation of output shocks in-
fl uences infl ation. Suppose now that a “conservative” 
10 A. C u k i e r m a n : Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independ-
ence, Cambridge 1992.
central banker is put in charge of monetary policy. 
Conservative means that the central banker is more in-
fl ation averse than the government. The loss function 
of the central banker can therefore be written as:
(4) = 1 + ε π2 + χLcb t  (yt – yt*)22 2
where ε denotes the additional infl ation aversion of the 
central banker. The preferences of the central banker 
do not matter, unless (s)he is able to determine mon-
etary policy. In other words, the central bank should 
be able to pursue monetary policy without (much) gov-
ernment interference. This can simply be modelled as 
follows:11
(5) = γ Lcb+ LG Mt (1 – γ )
where γ denotes the degree of central bank independ-
ence, i.e. the extent to which the central banker’s loss 
function affects monetary policy making. If γ = 1, the 
central bank fully determines monetary policy M. With 
rational expectations and minimising government’s 
loss function, infl ation will be:
(6) = χ yt* – χπt  ut1 + γ ε 1 + γ ε + χ
11 S. C. W. E i j f f i n g e r, M. H o e b e r i c h t s : The trade off between 
central bank independence and conservativeness, in: Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, Vol. 50, 1998, pp. 397-411.
Figure 1
The Optimal Level of Central Bank Independence 
and Conservativeness
L
γ  ε* γ  ε
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
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Comparing equations (3) and (6), one can immedi-
ately see that the infl ationary bias (the fi rst term on the 
right hand of the equations) is lower for positive values 
of γ  and ε. In other words, delegating monetary policy 
to an independent and “conservative” central bank 
will yield a lower level of infl ation. There is an optimal 
level of independence cum conservativeness (γ ε*). Un-
der certain assumptions, this is shown graphically in 
Figure 1. Optimal means that the loss function of the 
society (eq. 1) is minimised.
It also follows from equation (6) that both independ-
ence and the infl ation aversion of the central bank 
matter. If the central banker has the same infl ation 
aversion as government (i.e. ε = 0), the independ-
ence does not matter. And similarly, if the central bank 
is fully under the spell of government (i.e. γ = 0), the 
conservativeness of the central bank does not mat-
ter. There are various combinations of γ and ε that may 
yield the same outcome, including the optimal one. We 
illustrate this in Figure 2.
From a practical point of view the concept of a “con-
servative” central banker seems, however, void, since 
the preferences of possible candidates for positions in 
the governing board of a central bank are generally not 
very easy to identify and may change after they have 
been appointed. It is therefore hard to fi nd a real world 
example of a “conservative” central banker. Still, one 
could argue that the statute of the central bank could 
be relevant here, especially with respect to the ques-
tion of whether or not it defi nes price stability as the 
Figure 2
Trade-off between Conservativeness and 




primary goal of monetary policy. Whether or not the 
statute of a central bank defi nes price stability as the 
primary policy goal can be considered as a proxy for 
the “conservative bias” of the central bank as embod-
ied in the law.12
Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view it can thus be ar-
gued that an independent central bank may reduce 
the infl ationary bias of monetary policy-making. What 
about the empirical evidence? A substantial amount 
of empirical research supports the inverse relation-
ship between central bank independence and the level 
of infl ation.13 The negative relationship between indi-
cators of central bank independence and infl ation in 
OECD countries is quite robust, even if various control 
variables are included in the regression. Still, it should 
be noted that a negative correlation does not neces-
sarily imply causation. The correlation between both 
variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the 
culture and tradition of monetary stability in a coun-
try. However, sometimes central bank independence 
is a condition sine qua non to establish the culture 
and tradition of monetary stability in a country (e.g. in 
France).
President Jean-Claude Trichet’s concern about the 
status of the ECB under the new Treaty and his fear 
that by including the bank in a list of EU institutions 
there is a risk that EU member states could formulate 
policy recommendations to the ECB, is not only true, 
but may also lead to more conservativeness (infl ation 
aversion) on the part of the ECB. Central bankers are 
like whipping cream: the more politicians stir them, the 
stiffer they become!
Politicians, such as President Sarkozy, should re-
alise that their attempts to downgrade the ECB’s in-
dependence legally and verbally will only increase its 
conservativeness in order to maintain the same infl a-
tionary bias and limit the ECB’s degrees of freedom 
with respect to its interest-rate policy. The conse-
quences of these attempts are relative higher interest-
rates in the eurozone, exactly the opposite of what 
they wish to achieve. 
Sometimes it is better to tie yourself, like Odysseus, 
to the mast in order to resist the siren song.
12 A. C u k i e r m a n , op. cit.
13 Cf. S. C. W. E i j f f i n g e r, J. De H a a n : The Political Economy of 
Central-Bank Independence, in: Princeton Special Papers in Interna-
tional Economics, No. 19, 1996.
